Creating Frankenstein: The Impact of Saudi Export of Ultra-Conservatism in South Asia (Part 2)


A Case in Point

The narrative of Tashfeen Malik is a covering in point. Her experience and that of her tribe is indicative of the kind of tensions tenacity to Wahhabism’s narrow mindset have power to foster.  Malik moved with her parents to Saudi Arabia at what time she was a toddler. The sum of ~ units decades in Saudi Arabia persuaded the parents and children to abandon their Sufi practices that included visiting shrines, honouring saints and enjoying Sufi trance music  – practices rejected by the dominion’s Wahhabism‎. The change sparked tensions by relatives in Pakistan, whom the Maliks accused in Wahhabi cast of rejecting the oneness of God ~ the agency of revering saints. Syed Nisar Hussain Shah, every academic at Bahauddin Zakariya University in Malik’s genuine Pakistani town of Multan, whose madrassas are known at the same time that jihadist nurseries, where she studied Pharmacology, recalls Malik seeking help because her conservative norms clashed through more the comparatively more liberal values of her chamber mates. “She told me, ‘my parents live in Saudi Arabia, and I am not acquisition along with my roommates and cannot trim with them, so can you aid me?’” Shah recalls.[i]

While in Pakistan, Malik learned Islam for 18 months at the Al-Huda Institute, a strict school with branches in Britain, the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka that propagates non-impetuous Wahhabism.[ii]  Students at Islamabad’s Islamic International University, whose mosque was donated by Saudi Arabia and whose from abroad liaisons are primarily Saudi universities, are encouraged to dance ~ance on religious classes at Al Huda.[iii] Cultural anthropologist Sadaf Ahmad describes Al Huda since a “school-turned-social change.”[iv] Former students of Al Huda explain a curriculum that educates them in puritan Islam, encourages them to detach themselves from the outside world and inspect it as hostile, and in some cases, brings vulnerable youth to the border of radicalism. Al Huda’s Toronto cognate line closed its doors in December 2015 following advice reports that four of its students had attempted to join IS.[v] After enrolling in Al Huda, Malik donned a hijab, refrained from commerce with the opposite sex, and worn out most of her time studying the Quran.[vi]

“Women would repeatedly weep, overcome by religiosity. We were constantly taught that this path was our uncommon, but also that not choosing it was the tendency of action of sin. Gradually, perhaps because I was hostile from my family, young and troubled, and my discipline in Britain had provided me through little secular knowledge, I was completely sucked in… Only in review do I realise that essentially I’d been brainwashed into somebody resembling a cult… I be excited that al-Huda’s literalist, conservative interpretation of Islam, which discouraged art of criticising or dissent, built a fire. It laid from a high to a low position the kindling, the twigs, the wood, ready for a match. And the flames swept in from couple directions. First, from geopolitical events: the hold forth of Muslim oppression that has gained legion across the world, which Islamic State, among others, uses so powerfully. Yet it also requires an internal fire, something in the inside of an individual that will ignite fundamentalist divinity into violent action. Most women who allowance al-Huda institute are zealous in quest of a while, but the sheer strength requires so much emotional energy that it invariably fizzles out… This happened to me… Yet in that place was a time when I was remote, isolated, a troubled girl with nothing but my all-encompassing faith, whereas I know that a spark could obtain been ignited within me. I walked steady. Tashfeen Malik lit the fire,” afore~ Aliyah Saleem.[vii]

“All her students, who you would conceive after coming closer to God, would change to more tolerant and at peace, have always showed the opposite result. They became proscriptive, judgmental and arrogant instead… There is nay real proof to back the rationale that Al-Huda brainwashed Tashfeen and others into reign of terror, but one thing that is with respect to sure is that Madame Hashmi’s [Al-Huda co-trip Farhat Hashmi] institute promotes unhealthy rabid zeal and an orthodox manner of reflection. And that could very well fit one into a cold blooded cut-throat given just the right push; entirely in hopes to getting in heaven,” added preceding student Shamila Ghiyas, who had attended divers classes given by Al-Huda co-institutor Farhat Hashmi.[viii]

Mosharraf Zaidi, ~y Islamabad-based columnist who specialises in cultivation issues, argues that if Malik was radicalised though studying in Pakistan, “it was as she was exposed to ways of meditation that these schools have helped to prefer. They require people to isolate themselves from modernity [immediately] –  television is wrong, eating McDonald’s is bad, mixing with the opposite gender is trespass.  And once you establish that segregation, then dehumanising people is easy…and suppose that you leave someone there, you wish left them on a cliff.”[ix]

For the bulk of mankind like Malik raised in a Wahhabi environment, while well as those who were not, jihadism’s seek reference of the case is in part the absolutism that radical-conservative strands of Islam project. Both apolitical or non-wild ultra-conservatism and jihadism see the acknowledgement of God’s singleness and His sovereignty as the greatest beauty drivers of a believer’s life. All other aspects of life, including household relationships, are secondary to that, that explains why adherents of the Islamic State and other jihadist groups ~times break from their families, as well in the same proportion that their past. Wahhabis dedicate their lives to supplication of god, study of religious texts and mosque attendance; jihadis add the dimension of hallowed war. Their dedication is rooted in Ibn Abd al Wahhab’s predication that “worship of Allah cannot be performed until taghut (polytheism) is denounced and rejected.”[x]

Educational Vacuum

Al Huda and Malik’s case in point highlights the educational vacuum in Pakistan, that combating strands of Islam, including Wahhabism, Salafism and jihadism are clever to exploit in a country by a poor educational infrastructure and the same of the world’s lowest schooling budgets.[xi]  Pakistan’s some 26,000 madrassas graduate an estimated 200,000 students a year. [12] 

To exist sure, the madrassas run the gamut in terms of theological orientation and condition. They also run from mud-walled structures with rote memorisation of the Quran at their core, to sophisticated institutions like Al Huda, to utterly jihadi conveyor belts.  A Harvard Kennedy School study entice enrolment in madrassas at only 7.5 percent of totality children enrolled in Pakistani schools. It argued that enrolment had remained stanch much of the first decade of the 21st century.[13] By contrast, the International Crisis Group estimated that 1.5 the masses students were enrolled in Pakistani madrassas in 2002.[14]

Nonetheless, a 2008 cable from the U.S. consulship in Lahore reported that “pecuniary support estimated at nearly US $100 million  by the year was making its way to (conservatory) Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the neighborhood from ‘missionary’ and ‘Islamic charitable’ organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, ostensibly through the direct support of those governments…”[15] U.S. diplomat Bryan Hunt estimated in the cable that up to 200 madrassas in southerly Punjab, in towns like Multan considered in the state of well in Dera Ghazi Khan – a junction of all four of Pakistan’s provinces – and in the central incorporated town of Bahawalpur, served as recruitment dregs for militant Islamist groups.

The consulate’s mainspring officer, Hunt, reported in his cable to magistrates in Washington that the funding had spawned a “network (that) reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas…to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-el Hadith madrassa reticulated from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centres, and in the end sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).” He afore~ families with a large number of children who audacity financial difficulty as a result of self-conceit, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment are targeted on the side of recruitment.[16]

Hunt said Gulf funding of generous activities of charities that fronted as being groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed that had been proscribed ~ means of the U.S. Treasury, had increased the limited population’s dependence on extremist groups and undermined the influence of moderate Sufi religious leaders.  Hunt uttered that the charities targeted boys up to the years of discretion of 15. The funds, the diplomat uttered, had officially been transferred to Pakistan to promote victims of a 2008 earthquake in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. “Locals confident that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southerly and western Punjab in order to open these sects’ presence in a traditionally at variance, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground.  The incipient success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to posterior annual ‘donations’ to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Hunt said”[17]

The U.S. diplomat suggested that the control of officials in key positions in the Pakistan bureaucracy, who were pitiful to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith, had thwarted efforts through Sufi and other religious scholars to impel the government to crackdown on extremist funding. “The brother of the Federal Minister as far as concerns Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his possess right, Allama Qasmi, blamed government intransigence up~ a culture that rewarded political deals by religious extremists.  He stressed that not only so if political will could be build, the bureaucracy in Religious Affairs, Education, and Defence Ministries remained dominated through (former president) Zia ul Haq appointees, who favoured the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith pious ideologies.  This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had again and again blocked his brother’s efforts to push skill in a different direction,” Hunt reported.[18]

Describing in relate how Saudi funds were put to work, Hunt reported that “the limited Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana (devotional scholar) will generally be introduced to the house through these (charitable) organisations.  He faculty of volition work to convince the parents that their want is a direct result of their parents and children’s deviation from ‘the very well path of Islam’ through ‘idolatrous’ revere at local Sufi shrines and/or through local Sufi Peers.  The maulana suggests that the quickest passage to return to ‘favour’ would be to devote the lives of the same or two of their sons to Islam.  The maulana determination offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to light upon them employment in the service of Islam.  The universal of ‘martyrdom’ is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are ‘martyred’ as well-as; not only-but also; not only-but; not alone-but the sons and the family power of choosing attain ‘salvation’ and the line of ancestors will obtain God’s favour in this life, taken in the character of well.  An immediate cash fee is finally made to the parents to make compensation the family for its ‘sacrifice’ to Islam. Local sources claim that the current medial sum rate is approximately Rs. 500,000 (nearly US$ 6,500) per son,” Hunt wrote.[19]

Hunt reported the children were sent to unit of up to 200 madrassas located in solitary areas where they are prevented to get contact with the outside world and inculcated with “sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan dominion philosophy. Graduates from the school are one or the other employed as clerics and teacher or recommend on to jihadist training camps.[20]

The instil lation of Saudi money and Wahhabism into Deobandi schools, more of which have produced many of the Taliban’s leaders, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, the group’s greatest possible commander and spiritual guide who reportedly died in 2013; and Jalaluddin Haqqani, a cogent commander, has changed the very temper of the movement. ‘As Pakistan’s plan and politics have moved towards West Asia, and gone from an Indian history and accomplished, its various Islams have also been influenced ~ dint of. these trends. Pakistan’s version of Deobandi Islam is affected by Saudi Wahhabism, and hence it becomes intricate to argue that these madrassas are continually in any sense Deobandi… Islam, uniform Pakistani and Afghani Islam, is at once globalised, Wahhabised, as well as artificial by geopolitical influences, which have a remote-reaching impact on local and home Islam,” said scholar of International Relations, S. Akbar Zaidi.[21]

U.S. Democratic senator Chris Murphy took the exemplification of a possible parent in a unworthy town in northwest Pakistan, to delineate her/his vulnerability. “You’re unlettered, you’re poor, you’re getting poorer by the day, unemployment in your hamlet is sky high, inflation is material everything unaffordable, your crop yields gain been terrible. And one day, you possess a visit that changes your perspective. A cleric from a nearby conservative mosque offers you a different avenue. He tells you that your beggary is not your fault, but sincerely a punishment handed down to you inasmuch as of your unintentional deviation from the authentic path of Islam. And luckily, there’s a scheme to get right with God, to resign your son’s life to Islam. And it gets equable better, because the cleric’s going to bring up your son in his own place of education, we call them madrassas, and not but will you not have to pay in the place of the education, he’ll actually pay you… And when your son finishes school he’ll memorize employment in the service of Islam,” Murphy said.[22]

“And so for thousands of families in distressed places like northwest Pakistan, it’s a fine easy choice,” Murphy said. “But in the same manner with you go on, you lose junction with your son. Gradually, the academy cuts off your access to him. When you practise see him, now and again, he’s changing. And at another time one day it’s over. He’s not the miniature boy you once knew. He’s a teenager, announcing to you that the and nothing else way to show true faith to Islam is to combat for it against the kafir, the infidels who are wearisome to pollute the Muslim faith, and close up to the Westerners who are trying to destroy it. He tells you that he’s going facing to Afghanistan, or Syria, or Iraq by some fellow students, and that you shouldn’t worry in an opposite direction him because God is on his verge,” Murphy added.[23]

The parents try to get out what happened at the seminary for their son to become a jihadist. “You reveal the textbooks that he read, that strained a brand of Islam greatly influenced by something called Wahhabism… I recount you this story because, as you understand, some version of it plays confused hundreds of times every day in very much-flung places, from Pakistan to Kosovo, from Nigeria to Indonesia – the instruction of an intolerant version of Islam to hundreds of millions of young lower classes. In 1956, there were 244 madrassas in Pakistan. Today there are 24,000. So these schools are multiplying wholly over the globe. And don’t persuade me wrong, these schools, by and comprehensive, they don’t teach violence. They aren’t the minor leagues for extremist groups. But they bring about teach a version of Islam that leads excessively nicely into an anti-Shia, anti-Western militancy,” Murphy said.[24]

The pervasiveness in Pakistan of Saudi-backed extremist-conservative-inspired militant Islamist ideology was in c~tinuance full display in the Pakistani principal of Islamabad when authorities opted to close down all cell phone coverage for the time of Friday prayers to prevent dissemination of a homily by Maulana Abdul Aziz, rather than stop the jihadist imam. Abdul Aziz, dubbed Mullah Burqa in relation to he tried to escape in 2007 from Islamabad’s Red Mosque at a time that it was besieged by Pakistani military troops, has since been banned from giving sermons. Eight years on the model of the siege in which 75 men died, Abdul Aziz has re-emerged in the same manner with a seemingly untouchable figure, even whether militant groups like Teheek-e-Taliban more valuable known as the Pakistani Taliban that he supports consider been significantly weakened in a military crackdown. Abdul Aziz illustrated the rank to which Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism inspired doctrine of the evolution of ideas had gained currency in Pakistani copartnership.[25]

So did two events in seasonably in 2016: mass demonstrations in February and March protesting the writ of Mumtaz Qadri,  a jihadist who was each elite Force commando who was convicted to death for killing former Punjab governor Salman Taseer for the reason that of his opposition to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws,[26] and for carrying exhausted a suicide-bombing of a park in Lahore put ~ Easter Sunday.[27] As emergency units rushed to the park at which place 70 people had been killed and more 300, mostly women and children, wounded police in Islamabad sought to rule a 10,000-strong demonstration opposite to Qadri’s execution. Jammat-ul-Ahrar, every offshoot of the Pakistani Taliban before-mentioned the bombing was aimed at Christians uniform if the vast majority of the victims were Muslims.

Taken unitedly, the two events suggested that Pakistan’s riddle went beyond political violence, to belt a deep-seated, ultra- conservative and overbearing interpretation of Islam that has taken radix in significant segments of society, and has created each environment in which oppression, discrimination and boisterousness against the other is legitimised. The Economist illustrious that, “the religious hatred it (Jammat-ul-Ahrar) represents has been assiduously cultivated in Pakistan instead of many years. Saudi money for the building of madrassas (religious seminaries) began to great flow into Pakistan during the 1980s through the encouragement of the president at that time, General Zia ul Haq, a Deobandi adherent, who saw the country’s Islamisation viewed like his main mission. There are at this moment some 24,000 madrassas in Pakistan, attended ~ the agency of at least 2 million boys. Nearly tot~y adhere to the highly conservative Deobandi denomination, whose beliefs are similar to Saudi Wahhabism.” Some analysts oblige the number of madrassas closer to 30,000. They scholium that while a majority fall in the kingdom of the Deobandi, a substantial account subscribe to other interpretations of the dependence.[28]

The magazine quoted Tahir Ashrafi, thought of the Pakistan Ulema Council, in the same manner with saying that 60% of the pupils at madrassas were “not involved in in ~ degree training or terrorist activities.” In other war of ~, 40 percent may be. “It’s a extremely complex feeder system. All the remaining 40% are not involved in reign of terror or terrorist training, but they could exist sympathisers, they could funnel part of their funds to consternation outfits, they could aid and back in various ways,” said Mahmoud, a Pakistani counsel, businessman and author of a forthcoming book on Islam.[29]

In the part, Mahmoud recalls that “a lustrous young woman who worked with my aunt succeeded in discerning a religious centre in the outskirts of Islamabad. The midst served as an orphanage and instruct for girls. It taught them a mode of dealing of jihad. On occasion, young women, teenage girls, positively, from the centre would be introduced to teenage boys from other centres.  If a boy was to be sent on a self-destruction mission, he would be married to a lassie, and the couple would be allowed to effect their marriage. The experience was intended to get ready the boy a foretaste of the pleasures that awaited him in heaven, the young unmarried woman an assurance of a place in heaven in the manner that the wife of a martyr.  If the stripling did indeed complete his mission, the damsel would be free to remarry. If the boy did not achieve martyrdom, the married pair would be kept apart, in purgatory on this earth. Both boy and young woman were provided strong incentives to push towards the termination of suicide. The centre has been closed, nevertheless its cloistered, manipulative spirit endures.”[30]

The fallout of Deobandi science of causes – a “back to basics movement” in the talk of British Deobandi Mufti Mohammed Amin Pando –   goes remoter beyond the realm of South Asia, embedding itself to in Muslim minority communities in Europe. A 2016 BBC investigative documentary traced jihadist reflecting to a month-long visit to Britain in 1993 ~ means of Masood Azhar, a graduate of a Deobandi madrassa called Darul Uloom Islamia Binori Town in Karachi, who headed the Pakistani contending group Harakat ul Mujahedeen. Azhar, a stout bespectacled preacher, son of a Bahawalpur godly studies teacher and author of a four-body treatise on jihad as well for the re~on that books with titles like Forty Diseases of the Jews,[31] gave 40 lectures during his fundraising and recruitment tour in Britain, and was feted through Islamic scholars from Britain’s largest mosque network. More and more scholars joined his entourage because he toured the country before touching on to Saudi Arabia. His course included Darul Uloom Bury (Bury House of Knowledge), a boarding control and seminary that was home to Sheikh Yusuf Motala, Britain’s first Islamic scholar.[32] A passionate and emotive spokesman, women reportedly took off their jewellery and handed it to Azhar later listening to his speeches.[33]

Deobandis, the Muslim sect with the greatest reach in the U.K., restrain an estimated 40 percent of everything British mosques that service an estimated 600,000 the public. A substantial number of UK-educated Muslim scholars are graduates of Deobandi institutions. Deobandis record their roots to a seminary established in 1866, in the Indian court end of Deoband in the state of Uttar Pradesh, that was founded in the struggle contrary to British colonialism. The seminary is widely viewed similar to one of the foremost institutions of Islamic wide information, although it consists of a innkeeper of departments that focus on the declination of Christianity, Judaism, Shia Islam, Barelvism and a postgraduate regularity that teaches loathing of Ahmadis[34]  a sect is widely viewed by conservative Muslims taken in the character of heretic, because it recognizes Mirza Ghulam Ahmad at the same time that the messiah prophesied by Mohammed. .[35]  “The divinity of the Deoband school…fosters conversable change and nurtures the ideals of national activism,” noted Islam scholar Ebrahim Moosa. Its adherents be fusible the gamut from political quietists to reduce-minded social activists to militant Islamists like the Taliban.[36]

With Pakistan congruous a battleground in the proxy the last argument of kings between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the a~n of the 1979 Islamic revolution, Deobandis, funded through Saudi Arabia, launched an anti-Shia campaign. 

The of fire Deobandi cleric Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a madrassa regulate who became head of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a Deobandi combination, is reported to have maintained shut up ties to Pakistani intelligence[37] till he was killed in 1990 by Shiite militants. Jhangvi, who earned his spores by his agitation against the Ahmadis, [38]  founded Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba (Soldiers of the Prophet’s Companions) by the sole purpose of combating Shiites. With Pakistani Shiites sentiment empowered and emboldened by the Iranian organic change, Saudi Arabia was more than of a mind to generously fund the anti-Shiite campaign.[39]  As mentioned earlier, Saudi funds were largely routed from one side the Pakistani military and the ISI.[40] The Muslim World League furthermore funded the prominent Indian Deobandi student, Muḥammad Manz̤oor Naumani, who compiled a main division of anti-Shiite fatwas that included opinions of Pakistani scholars and was distributed in Pakistan.[41]

Marouf Dualibi, each Islamic scholar with close ties to Saudi King Fahd was dispatched ~ dint of. the kingdom to help General Zia bring into use hudood, the Islamic legal concept of chastisement as well as mandatory zakat, a benign tax, and ushr, an agricultural levy that dates back to early Islam, as well as persuade the Pakistani leader to adopt anti-Shia laws.[42] A 1981 announcement by the Council of Islamic Ideology – every advisory body of clerics and scholars established to serve the Pakistani government in bringing laws in short letter with the Quran and the example of the Prophet Mohammed – reported that hudood laws were discussed ~ means of the Council and the Law Ministry “in a state of inferiority to the guidance of Dr. Maruf Dualibi, who was specially detailed by the government of Saudi Arabia against this purpose.”[43]

Pakistani guard consultant Muhammad Amir Rana reported that Saudi Arabia in the primeval decade of the 21st century had donated US $2.7 the masses to the education department of the municipality of Jhang in Punjab, Jhangvi’s hometown, for the funding of madrassas.[44] The Saudi campaign aimed at pressuring the Pakistani control to designate the Shiites as non-Muslims and operate Sunni Islam the basis for an Islamic state. This also served to boost the fortunes of the Deobandis, who until then had been a minor demeanor, at the expense of other Muslim groups, singly the Sufis.[45]  “The Saudis injected preservative attitudes into Muslim societies. They infiltrated Muslim societies. It created multitude divisions and a sectarian culture. It has impacted Pakistan’s affable fabric,” Rana said in every interview.[46]

Sipah-e-Sahab’s members swelled to a million, including some 5,000 well-trained militants who waged a campaign of ~ism against Shiites. The group was backed ~ dint of. a fatwa issued by the Deobandi learner Naumani, that declared Shiites to subsist non-believers and was endorsed by hundreds of scholars in India and Pakistan. Maulana Wali Hassan, the Deobandi sublime mufti of Pakistan, banned Sunni Muslims from marrying Shiites, participating in Shiite obsequies rites, burying Shiites in Muslim graveyards and catheretic meat from animals slaughtered by Shiites equitable in accordance with Islamic law.[47]

Saudi Arabia at the identical time backed Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the internationally designated terrorist who founded Lashkar-e-Taibe, undivided of the largest and most of sharp militant Islamist groups in South Asia, as of his longstanding ties to the sovereign power and his  strong links to the Ahl-e-Hadith[48]  group that had maintained close bonds by ultra-conservatives like the Wahhabis and Salafis ago its founding in the 1920s.[49] Saeed, a divide into regular intervals of an Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa and the King Saud University in Riyadh, backed ~ the agency of Saudi money, founded Islamic schools in what one. potential jihadis not only studied Islam, on the contrary also acquired the computer and conversation skills they would need in their contending Islamist career.[50]

Much of the British Deobandi common has in the wake of 9/11 sought to distance itself from the minority of originally Pakistani scholars and madrassas that opt in opposition to an endorsement of violent jihad. Motala, , in ~y Urdu-language note to the BBC declared that “during the last distinct decades, I have neither uttered Masood Azhar’s descriptive term in my speeches, even by be wide of the mark, nor mentioned his group, nor talked about any nihilistic terrorist action.”[51] The UK’s Office during Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted), notwithstanding, concluded on the basis of ~y unannounced visit to DarulUloom Bury in January 2016, that its students had a ~est part understanding of “fundamental British values, in the same state as democracy, rule of law, individual privilege and mutual respect and tolerance in spite of those of different faiths.”[52]

Read further Part 3

[i] Declan Walsh, “Tashfeen Malik Was a ‘Saudi Girl’ Who Stood Out at a Pakistani University”, The New York Times, 6 December 2015,

[ii]Al-Huda International,, 2016.

[iii]Amna Shafqat, “Islamic University Islamabad: My discipline in a Saudi funded university”, Pak Tea House, 11 February 2015, http://pakteahouse.without deductions/2015/02/11/islamic-university-islamabad-my-schooling-in-a-saudi-funded-university/.

[iv] Sadaf Ahmad, Transforming Faith: The Story of Al-Huda and Islamic Revivalism amidst Urban Pakistani Women, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009.

[v] The Canadian Press, “Al Huda Institute Canada Shuts Doors Following Terror-Related Allegations”, 8 December 2015, on foot-canada_n_8752790.html.

[vi]Sara Mahmood and Shahzeb Ali Rathore, “Online Dating of Partners in Jihad: Case of the San Bernardino Shooters”, RSIS Commentary, 18 January 2016,

[vii] Aliyah Saleem, “Al-Huda exercise is an institute of Islamist zeal”, The Australian, 16 December 2015,

[viii]Shamila Ghyas, Al-Huda mightn’t have ~ing linked to terrorism, but Farhat Hashmi’s misogynistic and Shiaphobic commence is a hub of radicalization, The Nation, 10 December 2015, ~ing-linked-to-terrorism-but-farhat-hashmi-s-misogynistic-and-shiaphobic-ordain.

[ix] Tim Craig, Pakistan is muffle trying to get a grip up~ the body its madrassa problem, The Washington Post, 16 December 2016, /2015/12/16/e626a422-a248-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html.

[x]Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab Al-Tauhid, The Book of Monetheism, Riyadh: Darussalam Publishers & Distributors, 1996, p. 20.

[xi] The World Bank, Government outlaying on education as % of GDP (%), 2016,

[12] Naveed Ahmad, How Pakistan’s unregulated madrassa scheme sows division and religious strife, Religion News Service, 22 December 2014,

[13] Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, AsimIjaz Khwaja and Tristan Zajonc, Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan

A Look at the Data, Harvard Kennedy School, December 2005,

[14] International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military: Asia Report No 36, 29 July 2002, the ~-asia/pakistan/036-pakistan-madrasas-extremism-and-the-warlike.aspx.

[15] Dawn, 2008: Extremist recruitment up~ the rise in south Punjab madrassahs, 21 May 2011, http://www.peep of

[16]Ibid. US Consulate Lahore

[17]Ibid. US Consulate Lahore

[18]Ibid. US Consulate Lahore

[19]Ibid. US Consulate Lahore

[20]Ibid. US Consulate Lahore

[21] S. Akbar Zaidi, The Ulema, Deoband and the (Many) Talibans, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44:19, 9-15 May 2009, p. 10-11.

[22] Council towards Foreign Relations, Chris Murphy on the Roots of Radical Extremism, 29 January 2016, the extremes-east-and-north-africa/chris-murphy-roots-radical-extremism/p37471.

[23]Ibid. Council of Foreign Relations

[24]Ibid. Council of Foreign Relations

[25] Rod Nordland, Pakistani Military Deals a Blow to Jihadists only not to Ideology, The New York Times, 17 December 2015,

[26] Dawn, Taseer’s killer Mumtaz Qadri hanged, 1 March 2016,

[27] The Economist, Bomb in Lahore: The unsusceptible choice for Pakistan, 2 April 2016,

[28] Email exchanges with the author on 2 April 2016 of Pakistani scholars.

[29] Email trade with the author on 4 April 2016.

[30]Mahboob Mohammed, Enlightenment Jihad: The Struggle to Realize the Islamic Reformation, Draft manuscript of forthcoming book provided to the maker.

[31], Molana Muhammad Masood Azhar’s Books, 2016, cause-molana-muhammad-masood-azhar-aid-1220.html.

[32] Innes Bowen, Masood Azhar: The personage who brought jihad to Britain, BBC News, 5 April 2016,

[33]Raffaello Pantucci, Maulana Masood Azhar in the British Jihad, Hurst, 24 January 2013,

[34] Owen Bennett-Jones, Deobandi Variations, Dawn, 21 April 2016, http://www.begin to be

[35] Owen Bennett-Jones, Deobandi Variations, Dawn, 21 April 2016, http://www.peep of

[36] Ibid. Moosa, p. 105

[37] Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, p. 92.

[38] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulema in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, Princeton: Princeton University force, 2002, p. 119

[39] Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War ~ward Terror, London: Routledge, 2015.

[40] S. V. R. Nasr, Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation? New Delhi: Ajay Kumar Jain in spite of Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2002, p. 92.

[41] Khaled Ahmed, Who killed General Zia? The Express Tribune, 7 December 2012,

[42] Khalid Ahmad, Can the Taliban subsist far behind? Indian Express, 21 March 2014, pronoun/opinion/columns/can-the-taliban-have existence-far-behind/.

[43] Council of Islamic Ideology, First Report forward Islamization of Laws contained in The Pakistan Code: Vol.1-1836-1871, Islamabad: Council of Islamic Ideology, 1981.

[44]Ibid. Sareen, p. 282.

[45]Ibid. Abbas

[46] Interview with the author, 28 June 2016

[47] Muhammad Moj, The Deoband Madrassah Movement, Countercultural Trends and Tendencies, London: Anthem Press, 2015, p. 105-5.

[48]Ibid. Abbas

[49] Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

[50]Ibid. Abbas

[51]Ibid. Bowen

[52] Dale Haslam, Darul Uloom School in Holcombe ‘promotes British values and balances worldly curriculum with Islamic education’ – inspectors, Bury Times, 2 March 2016,


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